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This study examines the influence of institutional environment on capital structure and debt maturity
choices by examining a cross-section of firms in 39 developed and developing countries. We find
that a country’s legal and tax system, the level of corruption and the preferences of capital suppliers
explain a significant portion of the variation in leverage and debt maturity ratios. Our evidence indicate
that firms in countries that are viewed as more corrupt tend to use less equity and more debt, especially
short-term debt, while firms operating within legal systems that provide better protection for financial
claimants tend to have capital structures with more equity, and relatively more long-term debt.  In
addition, the existence of an explicit bankruptcy code and/or deposit insurance is associated with higher
leverage and more long-term debt. We also find that firms tend to use more debt in countries where
there is a greater tax gain from leverage, while firms in countries with larger government bond markets
have lower leverage, suggesting that government bonds tend to crowd out corporate debt. Countries
with more extensive defined benefit pension funds have higher debt ratios and longer debt maturities,
whereas those with more extensive defined contribution fund activities have lower debt ratios. In addition,
debt ratios are lower in countries that limit the bond holdings of pension funds.  Finally, we do not
find a significant association between financing choices and the size of the insurance industry.
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This study examines the influence of institutional environment on capital structure and 
debt maturity choices by examining a cross-section of firms in 39 developed and 
developing countries. We find that a country’s legal and tax system, the level of 
corruption and the preferences of capital suppliers explain a significant portion of the 
variation in leverage and debt maturity ratios. Our evidence indicate that firms in 
countries that are viewed as more corrupt tend to use less equity and more debt, 
especially short-term debt, while firms operating within legal systems that provide better 
protection for financial claimants tend to have capital structures with more equity, and 
relatively more long-term debt.  In addition, the existence of an explicit bankruptcy code 
and/or deposit insurance is associated with higher leverage and more long-term debt. We 
also find that firms tend to use more debt in countries where there is a greater tax gain 
from leverage, while firms in countries with larger government bond markets have lower 
leverage, suggesting that government bonds tend to crowd out corporate debt. Countries 
with more extensive defined benefit pension funds have higher debt ratios and longer 
debt maturities, whereas those with more extensive defined contribution fund activities 
have lower debt ratios. In addition, debt ratios are lower in countries that limit the bond 
holdings of pension funds.  Finally, we do not find a significant association between 
financing choices and the size of the insurance industry.   
   1
1. Introduction 
Corporate financing choices are determined by a combination of factors that are related to 
the characteristics of the firm as well as to their institutional environment. Although most 
studies focus on the importance of firm characteristics by examining corporate financing 
choices within individual countries,
1  there is a growing literature that considers how 
institutional differences affect these choices.  To explore the cross-sectional variation in 
the institutional environment, these papers examine capital structure choices across 
countries (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001; Claessens, Djankov 
and Nenova, 2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996, 1998, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; 
De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008).  
This study builds on this recent literature in two important ways. First, because 
we consider these issues within a panel that includes industry fixed effects, together with 
firm-level variables, we identify the variation in capital structure across countries that 
cannot be explained by cross-country differences in the industrial mix and firm-level 
characteristics. Second, we consider a larger number of countries and a number of 
important institutional characteristics not previously explored in this literature.  
To understand our motivation, it is useful to illustrate the importance of country-
level factors relative to industry factors in determining capital structure.  A regression of 
firm leverage, measured as the book value of debt over the market value of the firm, on 
firm-specific variables, industry fixed effects and country fixed effects, has an adjusted 
R-square of 0.19.  When the regression is estimated with all variables except for country 
                                                 
1 Examples of empirical studies examining the association between firm characteristics and capital 
structure within specific countries include Titman and Wessels (1988) – U.S., Campbell and Hamao 
(1995) – Japan and Gatward and Sharpe (1996) – Australia.  Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) and Guedes and Opler (1996) examine the association between firm characteristics and debt 
maturity in the U.S.  Gatward and Sharpe (1996) undertake a similar study of debt maturity in Australia.   2
fixed effects, the adjusted R-square is reduced to 0.15.
2  However, in a regression that 
includes all variables except for industry dummies the adjusted R-square is reduced by 
only half as much, to 0.17.  When the full regression is estimated with debt maturity, 
measured as the book value of long-term debt to the book value of total debt, as the 
dependent variable, the R-square is 0.25.   When the regression is estimated with all 
variables except for country fixed effects, the R-square is substantially reduced to 
0.09.  However, in the regression that includes all variables except for industry fixed 
effects, the R-square is only slightly reduced to 0.23. 
These experiments indicate that the country in which the firm resides is a more 
important determinant of how it is financed than is its industry affiliation, which in turn 
suggests that differences in country level institutional factors are likely to have a first 
order effect on capital structure choices. To examine this possibility in more detail, we 
estimate a panel regression on a large sample of firms from 39 countries that examines 
the extent to which cross-country differences in capital structures can be explained by 
differences in tax policies; legal environment; and the importance and regulation of 
financial institutions. 
Our evidence suggests that the explanatory power of a model that includes 
between ten and twelve institutional variables explains the cross-section of debt ratios 
and maturity structures about as well as a model with 39 country dummy variables. These 
regressions indicate that firms tend to use more debt in countries with a greater tax gain 
from leverage, which contrasts with Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(2001) who, in an earlier study of mostly developing economies, do not find a significant 
                                                 
2 This result is similar in character to a regression reported by Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2001).   3
relation between debt ratios and tax policy.  In addition, we find that the strength of a 
country’s legal system and public governance importantly affect firm capital structure. 
Weaker laws and more government corruption are associated with higher corporate debt 
ratios and shorter debt maturity.
3  We also find that countries with deposit insurance or 
explicit bankruptcy codes, like the Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 rules in the U.S., have 
higher debt ratios and longer debt maturities. These findings reinforce the prior literature 
on the importance of the legal system, the enforcement of investor rights and financial 
distress resolution (Claessens, Djankov, Mody, 2001; Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and 
Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998) 
We also find that the preferences of the suppliers of capital influence capital 
structure choices.
4   In particular, firms in countries with larger banking sectors have 
shorter maturity debt, but the association between financing choices and the size of the 
insurance industry is weak.  In addition, firms in countries with higher levels of defined 
contribution pension fund assets use relatively more equity, while firms in countries with 
higher levels of defined benefit pension fund assets use relatively more long-term debt, 
which could reflect differences in how these pension assets are invested. Finally, we find 
that firms in countries with larger government bond markets have lower debt ratios and 
shorter maturity debt, indicating that government bonds tend to crowd out long term 
corporate debt. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 discusses the association between 
country level institutional factors and financial choices.  Section 3 introduces the set of 
                                                 
3 This result is consistent with Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (1999). 
4 One should interpret these results with some caution, because an analysis of capital suppliers does raise 
endogeneity concerns. In particular, we expect financial institutions to develop in ways that satisfy the 
financing needs of firms. However, as discussed in Section 2.3, we have selected variables that are less 
likely to be influenced by the capital structure preferences of corporations.   4
firm level variables that influence capital structure choice.  Section 4 describes the 
sample.  Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
 
2. Institutional factors and cross-country determinants of capital structure 
This section discusses how institutional differences between countries can potentially 
affect how firms within these countries are financed. Specifically, we consider 
institutional variables that reflect (1) the ability of creditors to enforce legal contracts (2) 
the tax treatment of debt and equity, and (3) the importance and regulation of financial 
institutions that represent major suppliers of capital.   
  We expect that weaker legal systems and weaker public enforcement of laws 
should be associated with less external equity and shorter maturity debt contracts. We 
also expect that firms in countries with lower tax preferences for debt will be less levered.  
Finally, we examine whether the suppliers of capital matter.  Although most of the capital 
structure literature focuses on the financing preferences of firms, at the aggregate level, 
firm capital structures are determined by the preferences of the suppliers of capital (i.e. 
investors) as well as the preferences of firms.  In particular, exogenous factors that lead 
suppliers of capital to prefer to hold more or less equity relative to debt will also 
influence the capital structures of firms. 
  The following sub-sections introduce the variables that we consider, and discuss 
how these variables are likely to influence typical debt ratios within our sample of 
countries.     5
2.1. Legal system 
Incentive problems - conflicts of interest between corporate insiders (managers, 
employees and/or majority shareholders) and external investors - are important factors 
that shape corporate policy and productivity.  As extensively explored by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), the extent to which contracts can be used 
to mitigate these problems depends on the legal system, which consists of both the 
content of the laws and the quality of their enforcement.  In the following discussion we 
will review how these legal factors influence financing choices. 
  In countries with weak laws and enforcement, financial instruments (e.g. short 
term debt) that allow insiders less discretion, and are contractually easier to interpret, are 
likely to dominate.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) find 
significant variation in the extent of legal protection of external investors across both 
developed and developing countries, and argue that legal systems based on common law 
offer outside investors (debt and equity) better protection than those based on civil law, 
resulting in higher security values (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
2002).  All else equal, this suggests that common law countries will use more outside 
equity and longer-term debt.  To test whether this is the case, we define an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if the country’s legal system is based on common law 
and zero otherwise.  
In addition to the content of the law, the integrity and enforceability of the law is 
also important, which we measure by the perceived corruption level in a country.   
Corruption has been identified as a key factor shaping a country’s legal system (Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003), resource allocation and firm behavior (La   6
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999; Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 
2003). 
We are not the first to examine the roles of legal factors in corporate financing 
choices. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that firms have longer duration 
debt in countries where the legal system has more “integrity”. Integrity, measured by a 
law and order index prepared by the International Country Risk Guide, reflects the extent 
to which individuals are willing to rely on the legal system to make and implement laws, 
mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  In contrast, we focus on corruption, defined as 
the abuse of public office for private gain, measured as the Corruption Perception Index 
(Transparency International), which reflects the extent to which corruption is perceived to 
exist among public officials and politicians. An advantage of this index is that it provides 
both time-series and cross-sectional variation; most other measures of integrity, such as 
the law and order index, do not have comparable historical data.   
We reverse the index, so that in our study, it ranges from 0 to 10, with larger 
values indicating more severe corruption.  In the context of the firm’s capital structure 
choices, the index proxies for the threat of all or part of investor rights being expropriated 
by managers or public officials.  Debt is expected to be used relatively more than equity 
when the public sector is more corrupt, since it is easier to expropriate outside equity 
holders than debt holders.   Similarly, one can argue that since short-term debt is more 
difficult to expropriate, it will be used relatively more frequently than long-term debt in 
more corrupt countries. 
Finally, we investigate the enforcement of debt contracts. As identified by 
Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008), the legal structure that specifies the   7
resolution of default differs widely across countries. Indeed, in some countries, like the 
U.S., there is an explicit bankruptcy code that specifies and limits the rights and claims of 
creditors that facilitates the reorganization of the ongoing business.  In contrast, in other 
countries with no bankruptcy codes or only weakly enforced codes, creditors often have 
difficulty accessing collateral by liquidating distressed firms or seizing distressed firm 
assets (Claessens, Djankov, Mody, 2001; Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper, 2003; 
Claessens and Klapper, 2005; Davydenko and Franks, 2008; Dinc, 2005). With poorly 
defined bankruptcy procedures, senior lenders typically possess inferior bargaining power 
relative to the borrower in out-of-court renegotiations due to the weak laws and lenders’ 
inherent information disadvantage about the collateral relative to borrowers (Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) lowering demand for long-term debt. On the 
borrower side, the existence of defined bankruptcy procedures for corporate 
reorganization and the deferral of debt payments increase the incentive for firms to issue 
long term debt since a default can be less onerous.
5 We conjecture that the lack of explicit 
bankruptcy codes and enforcement discourage the use of debt, in particular long-term 
debt. Based on Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008), we define an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one for those countries in which an insolvent firm can 
undergo a court supervised reorganization proceeding.  
 
2.2. Tax code 
The tax system in general, and specifically the tax treatment of interest and dividend 
payments, has been recognized as an important factor influencing capital structure 
                                                 
5 The influence of the existence of a bankruptcy code on both investor demand for, and corporate supply of 
long-term debt was pointed out to the authors by an anonymous referee.   8
choices since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1963).
6  We observe three main 
categories of tax regimes: 
The first is the classical tax system in which dividend payments are taxed at both 
the corporate and personal levels and interest payments are tax-deductible corporate 
expenses.  The classical tax system exists in Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom (post 2000)
7  and the United 
States. 
The second is the dividend relief tax system, where dividend payments are taxed 
at a reduced rate at the personal level.  A dividend relief tax system exists in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand and Turkey.
8  In Greece and 
Turkey dividend payments are not taxed at the personal level, that is, a full dividend 
relief system.   
Third is the dividend imputation tax system, where corporations can deduct 
interest payments, but where the domestic shareholders of a corporation receive a tax 
credit for the taxes paid by the corporation.  The goal of the system is to tax corporate 
profits only once.  Dividend imputation systems are in place in Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Taiwan and 
United Kingdom (pre 2001).  The proportion of corporate tax available as a tax credit 
under these imputation systems varies from country to country.  In Australia, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, New Zealand and Norway the full amount of the corporate tax paid is 
                                                 
6 See Graham (2003) for a review of the literature on the influence of taxes on capital structure choice. 
7 The United Kingdom reverted to a classical tax system in 2001. 
8 The United States currently provides preferential tax treatment for dividend over interest payments, but 
not in our sample period.   9
distributed as a tax credit.  In other countries only part of the corporate tax credits are 
distributed. 
All else equal, we expect that debt will be used less in countries with dividend 
imputation or tax relief systems than in countries with classical tax systems that double 
tax corporate profits. To test for this relationship for each country in our sample, we 








where c  is the statutory corporate tax rate, i  is the highest statutory personal tax rate 
on interest income and e  is the highest effective personal tax rate on equity income 
coming from dividends.
9  
The tax gain from leverage can take both positive and negative values.  Negative 
values arise under a dividend relief tax system, when the personal tax rate on interest 
income is greater than the corporate tax rate and the personal tax rate on dividend income 
is less than the corporate tax rate.  This is the case under a full dividend relief system as 
exists in Greece and Turkey, as well as under some partial relief countries like Belgian 
and Thailand  The tax gain from leverage is zero under a full dividend imputation tax 
system, which is the case in Australia, Germany, Italy, New Zealand and Norway. For all 
other countries the value of the tax gain from leverage is positive.  
                                                 
9 We also consider a dividend tax indicator variable that takes a value of one for countries with either a full 
dividend relief tax system or a full dividend imputation tax system and zero otherwise.   10
 
2.3. Suppliers of capital 
Financial economists have typically viewed the capital structure problem from the 
perspective of firms that face competitive and complete financial markets, where debt 
and equity capital are offered at equivalent risk-adjusted rates.  However, when this is not 
the case, the preferences of investors to hold debt versus equity instruments will have an 
influence on how firms are financed.  For example, in the Miller (1977) model, the 
aggregate debt ratio in the economy is determined by aggregate investor preferences for 
holding debt versus equity securities.  While these preferences are determined by taxes in 
Miller’s model, one can more generally consider how investor preferences for holding 
various debt and equity instruments affect the capital structure choice of firms.
10   
We will specifically consider the preferences of banks, pension funds and 
insurance companies. Banks tend to have short-term liabilities and thus may have a 
comparative advantage holding short-term debt. In contrast, pension funds have long-
term liabilities, and thus have a preference for holding long term assets. Likewise, 
insurance companies tend to hold longer term assets.  Hence, we might expect firms in 
counties with a larger banking sector to use more short-term financing and firms in 
countries with larger pension funds and insurance sectors to use more long-term 
financing.  
The analysis of supply effects raise endogeneity concerns, since we expect 
financial intermediaries to develop in ways that satisfy the financing needs of firms as 
well as the preferences of investors. Existing studies (for example, Dermirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999; De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008) examine the effects of stock/bond 
                                                 
10 See Titman (2002) for a discussion of the effect of investor preferences on capital structure choices.   11
market size, turnover and bank total assets on capital structure choices.  These variables, 
however, are likely to be influenced by the capital structure preferences of corporations.  
For example, in countries with industries (like high tech) that require considerable 
amounts of external capital, the stock market is likely to be larger.
11  With this in mind, 
we depart from the existing literature and select proxies that are not likely to be directly 
influenced by the capital structure preferences of corporations. In particular, we select 
measures of the supply of funds available to these financial intermediaries. 
To proxy for the supply of funds to banks, we use deposits/GDP to measure the 
amount of funds that are available to the banking sector.
12 In addition, deposit insurance 
is used in many countries to protect bank depositors, in full or in part, from losses caused 
by a bank's inability to pay its debts when due.  This lowers the risk of bank runs, 
reducing the banks need to hedge and seek more liquid short-term debt.  We conjecture 
that the existence of deposit insurance will influence the lending and maturity choices of 
banks. In particular, banks provide more credit to firms and lend longer term debt when 
deposits are protected. Hence, one might expect that firms in countries with deposit 
insurance to have higher leverage and more long-term debt.  To test this relationship, we 
utilize a deposit insurance indicator variable that takes a value of one if bank deposits are 
                                                 
11 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) recognise this endogeneity issue and address it by using a two-
stage instrumental variable regression. They chose as instruments measures of the size of the economy and 
the flow of funds, plus proxies for the content, strength and integrity of the legal system. However, one can 
argue that these variables either directly influence the capital structure choice or are potentially influenced 
by the types of firms in the economy, and are thus indirectly related to the capital structure choice. 
12 It is possible that there are unobserved factors that affect both the willingness of investors to deposit 
funds with banks and the willingness of banks to provide long-term funding to firms, creating a spurious 
relation between deposits  and capital structure.  For example, one can argue that the financing needs of 
corporations affect the funds that are available to the different investor sectors.  Suppose, for example, that 
the need for monitoring declines, making bank loans somewhat less attractive to long-term bonds.  On the 
margin, this would increase the interest rate on long-term bonds, making it more attractive for households 
to invest in fixed income mutual funds rather than bank deposits.  While this creates a potential 
endogeniety problem, it is mitigated by the inclusion of our institutional variables and probably has a minor 
influence on our estimates.   12
at least partially explicitly insured by government and zero otherwise (Demirguc-Kunt, 
Karacaovali and Laeven, 2005). 
 We use insurance penetration (value of total insurance premiums (life and non-
life)/GDP) to measure the amount of funds that are available to insurance companies. 
Different insurance companies, however, may have very different liability structures and 
may thus have different preferences for the assets that they hold.  For example, life 
insurance companies that offer contracts with a substantial savings component, such as 
whole life contracts, might have a preference for long term debt.  In contrast, insurance 
companies that offer term life and property and casualty insurance tend to have shorter-
term obligations, and thus, are expected to hold shorter-term debt.  Unfortunately, we do 
not have data that allows us to distinguish between the different sectors of the insurance 
industry.  
We measure pension fund penetration separately as the value of defined benefit 
pension fund assets over GDP and the value of defined contribution pension fund assets 
over GDP.  This distinction may be important because in firms with defined benefit 
plans, the asset allocation is determined by the plan sponsors, while with defined 
contribution plans, the asset allocation is made by individuals. It should also be noted that 
defined benefit pension plans are often underfunded, creating a liability that we do not 
observe in our data set.   
In addition, since it is possible that cross-country differences in pension fund 
regulations influence the investment choices of pension funds, we also examine 
restrictions on debt and equity holdings of pension funds. We conjecture that the relative 
restrictions on debt and equity holdings will influence the choice between debt and   13
equity. In particular, pension funds will hold more equity when restrictions on bond 
holdings are tighter relative to those on equity holdings. Hence, one might expect that 
firms in countries with tighter restriction on bond holdings to issue more equity. To 
investigate this possibility we estimate an index of relative restrictions on debt and equity 
holdings measured as the ratio of the proportional limit on equity holdings over the 
proportional limit on debt holdings taken from the Survey of Investment Regulation of 
Pension Funds, OECD. For each year we ranked countries by their pension fund 
regulation index, assigning countries into quartiles.  We assigned a score of 1 to 4 to the 
quartiles, with larger values indicating tighter restriction on bond holdings. 
An alternative measure of the supply of funds available to financial intermediaries 
is the level of domestic savings, which we measure as gross domestic saving over GDP.  
In addition, we examine the size of the government bond market in each country by 
including domestically denominated government bonds/GDP as an independent variable. 
Government bonds can influence the supply of debt capital that is available to the 
corporate market for two reasons. The first is a simple crowding out argument. If there is 
a fixed supply of debt capital, then government debt can compete for that fixed supply 
and leave less available for corporate borrowers. The second possibility is that the supply 
is not fixed, and that the presence of government borrowers can help the debt market 
develop, increasing the demand for corporate debt.    
 
3.  Firm level characteristics and capital structure choice 
Consistent with the existing literature (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Guedes and 
Opler, 1996; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) we include a set of firm level variables that   14
capture factors that are known to affect leverage and maturity structure.  These variables 
include asset tangibility (fixed assets over total assets), profitability (net income over 
total assets), firm size (natural logarithm of total assets) and the market-to-book ratio 
(market value of equity over book value of equity).  Due to data limitations in some of 
the countries included in our study, we do not include variables that measure the effective 
tax rate, operating risk, research and development expenditure, capital expenditure and 
selling expenses as per Titman and Wessels (1988).  In place of these variables we 
include the market-to-book ratio, which can proxy for growth as well as the collateral 
value of assets, and industry indicator variables based on two-digit SIC codes.
13 
 
4. Data and sample 
This section describes the sample and presents the country and industry patterns of 
capital and debt maturity structures. It then introduces the empirical procedure employed 
in this study. 
 
4.1. Sample selection 
The primary source of our firm-level data is Worldscope, which contains financial data 
on companies from a wide range of industries in over 50 countries.  We restrict the 
sample to those firms listed on the stock market of the country in which it is domiciled. 
Our analysis covers the period of 1991 through 2006.  We exclude firm-year 
observations with missing financial data that is required for the firm-level analysis.  The 
final sample consists of 36,767 firms from 39 countries, totalling 272,092 firm-years.  
                                                 
13 See MacKay and Phillips (2005) for evidence on the importance of industry fixed effects.  
   15
Table 1 provides a description of the sample, which covers a broad cross section of 
developed and developing countries with every continent represented.  Most of the 
countries have observations in each of the 16 years. 
As can be seen from the last two columns of Table 1, the coverage of the sample 
firms varies across countries in terms of number and/or market capitalization, reflecting 
that Worldscope has uneven coverage of firms across the countries.  For most of the 
economies we have more than 60 percent of sample coverage in terms of market 
capitalization and 50 percent in terms of number of listed firms. The economies with 
lower data coverage tend to be developing economies. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2. Country financing patterns 
Our measures of capital structure are: 
(i)  leverage, measured as the proportion of total debt to market value of the firm 
(total debt/market value).  Total debt is defined to be the book value of short-
term and long-term interest bearing debt.  Market value of the firm is defined 
as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock plus 
total debt, or 
(ii)  debt maturity, measured as the proportion of the book value of long-term debt 
to total debt (long-term debt/total debt).
14 
To gain a basic idea about how capital and maturity structures differ across countries, 
we compute the median leverage and maturity structure by country for the period 1991 to 
                                                 
14 Trade credit is an important source of financing in economies with underdeveloped financial institutions 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Fisman and Love, 2003).  Our results are robust to including trade 
credit (measured as accounts payable) in our measure of short-term debt.   16
2006.  As can be seen in Figure 1, developing economies occupy both ends of the 
leverage spectrum.  The highest five leverage ratios are observed in South Korea, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Portugal, and Pakistan, while the lowest five are observed in Australia, 
South Africa, Canada, the United States, and Turkey. Developing economies seem to 
dominate the higher range, while developed economies tend to be at the lower range.  
The median leverage ratio for the developing economies in the sample is 0.26,
15 while for 
the developed economies the median leverage ratio is 0.20.  The middle range of the 
leverage spectrum is mixed with both developing and developed economies.  
 [Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 2 presents the median maturity structure by country.  It is clear from the 
figure that debt obligations have longer maturities in more developed economies.  The 
five countries with the highest long-term debt ratios are New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
USA, and Canada. The lowest five median long-term debt ratios are observed in China, 
Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and Thailand.
16   The median long-term debt ratio for the 
developing economies in the sample is 0.36, while for the developed economies the 
median long-term debt ratio is 0.61. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
In addition to the set of firm and country-level variables described in Section 2, 
we include inflation, inflation volatility (measured as the standard deviation of inflation 
rates over the preceding four years) and a developed economy indicator variable that 
takes a value of one if the country is classified as a developed economy according to the 
                                                 
15 Economies within the sample classified as developing, according to the World Bank, are Brazil, Chile, 
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and 
South Africa. 
16 This parallels the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) for an early sample period, 1980-
1991.   17
World Bank classification that is based on the countries’ gross national income levels.
17  
Inflation is included because debt contracts are generally nominal contracts and high 
inflation, which is generally associated with high uncertainty about future inflation, may 
tilt lenders away from long-term debt.  Likewise, higher inflation volatility reflects higher 
uncertainty about future inflation, tilting lenders away from long-term debt.  A developed 
economy indicator variable is included because it may pick up an element of economic 
development that is not already captured by our other variables.  Both firm and country 
level variables are lagged one period to allow for the non-contemporaneous nature of the 
interaction between firm/country level characteristics and financing choices. 
Table 2, which presents the summary statistics, shows cross-sectional variation in 
the country-level variables.   The country-level variables are defined in Appendix 1, 
along with their data sources. Except for the common law, developed economy, 
bankruptcy code and deposit insurance variables that are constant across time, all 
remaining variables exhibit time-series variation.
18  Appendix 2 reports the country-by-
country median values of the country-level explanatory variables. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
To gain a basic understanding of how debt ratios and maturity structures are 
influenced by these variables, we compute the Pearson correlation coefficients for pairs 
of the dependent and independent variables.  The results, reported in Table 3, suggest that 
the legal system, the tax system, and the suppliers of funds potentially influence the 
capital structure choice.  In particular,  
                                                 
17 The set of country level independent variables are defined in Appendix 1, along with their data sources. 
18 The corruption index prior to 1995 is taken as the 1988-1992 composite level, because compatible annual 
data is not available prior to 1995.   18
  firms in more developed economies have lower debt ratios and more long-
term debt; 
  common law is associated with lower leverage and more long-term debt; 
  low levels of corruption are associated with lower debt ratios and a greater 
use of long-term rather than short-term debt; 
  the existence of an explicit bankruptcy code is associated with higher debt 
ratios and a greater use of long-term debt; 
  firms in countries that have a higher tax preference for debt have higher 
debt ratios; 
  firms in countries with more bank deposits and larger domestic savings 
tend to have higher leverage and more short-term debt; 
  the existence of explicit deposit insurance is associated with more long-
term debt; 
  the level of defined contribution pension fund assets is associated with 
lower leverage; and 
  the level of defined benefit pension fund assets is associated with the use 
of long-term debt.
19 
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                 
19 In unreported analysis we examined these correlations in a number of subsamples.  Specifically, we 
separately examine developed and developing economies, and we divide the sample between two time 
periods, 1991-1998 and 1999-2006.  There are some differences between the subsamples. For example, we 
find that the correlation between leverage and common law is strong only in developed economies and 
taxes and deposit insurance are strongly correlated with leverage in only the initial sub-period.  In addition, 
the size of the government bond market is negative and highly correlated with leverage in developing 
economies, but only in the initial sub-period. Deposit insurance is positively correlated with debt maturity 
in only the later sub-period while insurance penetration is positively correlated with debt maturity in both 
sub-periods, but only in developing economies. Finally, the size of the government bond market is negative 
and strongly correlated with debt maturity in the later sub-period but only in developed economies.   19
To investigate whether these variables are likely to be subject to collinearity 
problems in our later regression analysis, we examine the correlations between the 
independent variables that are used in our analysis.  From Table 3, we see that most 
variables are not highly correlated with each other, with some notable exceptions.  In 
particular, the correlation between the economic development indicator variable and the 
corruption index is negative 76 percent. 
 
5. Regression analysis 
This section presents regressions that estimate the influence of country-level explanatory 
variables on capital structure choices controlling for firm- and industry-level 
characteristics.  Our regressions are estimated with a General Methods of Moments 
(GMM) approach that accounts for the fact that the regression residuals are 
heteroskedastic and serially correlated across both firm and country level observations.
20 
 
5.1. The determinants of leverage 
Table 4 presents the results of the leverage regressions.
21  Column one reports the 
regression for the full sample, column two provides evidence for the sub-sample of 
developed economies only and column three the sub-sample of developing economies 
only. Columns four and five provide evidence for the sub-periods, 1991-1998 and 1999-
                                                 
20 The regressions are performed on panel data where the residuals may be correlated across firms and/or 
across country, and OLS standard errors can be biased.  We use the ordinary least square (OLS) method 
with heteroscedastic / autocorrelation corrected (HAC) errors (Andrew, 1991) and clustered at the country 
level (Petersen, 2008). The HAC procedure accounts for the potential heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation at the firm level by deriving the t-statistics of estimated OLS coefficients from Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM) standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. 
21 The results are robust to the use of alternative proxies for the country’s legal system, corruption, taxation 
and financial market development.  Alternative proxies leave unaffected other estimated coefficients. In 
addition, results are substantially unchanged when we winsorize all variables at the 1 percent level.   20
2006, respectively, and Column six provides evidence for a sub-sample representing 
OECD countries for which pension fund bond/equity holding restriction information is 
available.  Column seven provides evidence for a select sub-sample of OECD countries 
for which pension fund asset information is available. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5.1.1. Firm effects 
The top half of Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates of our firm-specific variables.  
These coefficient estimates indicate that leverage is positively related to asset tangibility 
and firm size and negatively related to profitability, and the market-to-book ratio.  These 
results, which hold in the full sample as well as the sub-samples, are consistent with 
evidence on U.S. firms (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988) and 
more recent international evidence (Rajan and Zingales, 1995 and Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001; De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008). These 
results are also generally consistent with individual country leverage regressions that we 
report in Appendix 3.  The coefficients for the market-to-book ratio have the same sign in 
all country regressions. Asset tangibility and size are positively related to leverage in 38 
and 34 out of 39 countries, respectively.  Finally, profitability is negatively related to 
leverage in 36 out of 39 countries. 
 
5.1.2. Country effects 
The lower half of Table 4 reports coefficient estimates for country variables.  The 
regression for the full sample (Column 1) has an adjusted R-square of 0.1798 which is the   21
same order of magnitude as the preliminary result reported previously, regressing 
leverage on firm-specific variables, industry and country fixed effects. 
These coefficient estimates indicate that leverage is positively related to economic 
development, but unrelated to both inflation and inflation volatility. Consistent with 
better investor protection leading to a greater use of equity financing, we find that 
corruption is associated with higher debt ratios, common law systems are associated with 
lower debt ratios and the existence of an explicit bankruptcy code is associated with 
higher debt ratios.
22 In addition, we find that leverage is higher in countries where the tax 
gain from leverage is positive. This evidence contrasts with Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) who do not find a significant relation between debt ratios 
and tax policy.  This difference in results arises because of differences in both the sample 
countries and sample periods. The Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(2001) sample is mainly developing economies over the period 1980 to 1991. As we 
show, our evidence in favor of a tax effect comes from developed economies in a later 
time period.   
We find some support for the idea that suppliers of capital influence firm debt 
ratio choices.  In particular, we find that leverage is higher in countries with deposit 
insurance, suggesting that the banking industry is important, but we do not find a 
significant relation between the size of the banking sector and debt ratios.  In addition, we 
do not find a significant relation between leverage and the size of the insurance industry, 
                                                 
22 We also considered the possibility that in some countries regulatory barriers to entry might decrease the 
risk of incumbent firms and thereby increase their debt capacities.  To examine this in more detail, we 
considered regulatory variables introduced in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2002).    
However, because these variables are highly correlated with corruption and our common law indicator 
variable, we did not include them in the regression reported in Table 4.  The high correlation between these 
entry barrier variables and common law and corruption, however, may partially explain why common law 
and corruption have such a strong effect on the capital structure choice.   22
the level of domestic savings or the size of the government bond market.
23 However, in a 
select sample of OECD countries that report the level of pension fund assets we find that 
firms in countries with larger defined benefit pension funds have higher debt ratios and 
those with larger defined contribution pension funds have lower debt ratios. 
There are some significant differences between the subsamples. In particular, 
common law and the bankruptcy code are significant in the sample of developed 
economies, but not in the sample of developing economies; while deposit insurance and 
the size of the government bond market are important in developing economies, but not 
in developed economies. 
In addition, we find that the level of domestic savings and the size of the 
government bond market are significant in the 1991-1998 sub-period, but not in the 1999-
2006 sub-period, while taxes and deposit insurance are important in the later time period, 
but not in the former period. The negative association between leverage and the size of 
the government bond market in the 1991-1998 sub-period suggests that there may be a 
fixed demand for fixed-income securities, so that government bonds crowd out corporate 
bond issues. 
The subsample analysis reveals that corruption is consistently associated with 
higher debt ratios in all subsamples.  However, the common versus civil law distinction is 
less important in developing economies. On the other hand, deposit insurance is 
                                                 
23 The weak result with respect to insurance penetration may be due to the lack of a clear prediction as to 
the association between leverage and insurance penetration. Recognizing that life insurance incorporates 
both a savings (whole life and annuities) and an insurance (term insurance) product, we follow Beck and 
Webb (2003) and the suggestion of an anonymous referee, and proxy for the size of the insurance sector as 
a savings vehicle using insurance premiums/domestic savings. However, as with insurance penetration, we 
do not find a significant relation between leverage and insurance premiums/domestic savings.   23
significant in the latter time period, reflecting, perhaps, an increase in the number of 
countries adopting explicit deposit insurance from 23 to 33. 
Taxes are significant in the sample of developed economies, but not in the sample 
of developing economies, and only in the later time period. This may be due to the 
observation that the influence of corporate taxes is likely to be weaker in countries where 
they are easier to evade.
 24  In unreported regressions, we find that taxes are significant in 
a sample of below median tax evasion countries, but not in a sample of above median tax 
evasion countries.
25  With this index, our entire sample of developing economies is 
characterized as high tax evasion countries.  
In addition, we consider an alternative tax measure that considers only the tax 
treatment of dividends. As discussed in footnote 9, we estimate a dividend tax indicator 
variable that takes a value of one for countries with either a full dividend relief tax system 
or a full dividend imputation tax system and zero otherwise. With this measure we find 
that leverage is lower in countries that tax dividends less, and this result holds strongly in 
all subsamples and sub-periods.  
Finally, we find that the coefficients of inflation volatility, which are insignificant 
in about half the regressions, is significantly positive in the developed country subsample, 
the subsample of OECD countries for which pension fund asset information is available 
and in the total sample of countries in the 1999-2006 sub-period.  We also find negative 
associations between leverage, the size of the banking sector and the existence of deposit 
                                                 
24 The likelihood that the potential to avoid paying taxes influences the strength of the relationship between 
taxes and leverage was pointed out to the authors by an anonymous referee 
25 Based on the World Bank tax evasion index, World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 
2001/2002.   24
insurance in the developed economy subsample.  These latter two findings are 
inconsistent with our expectations, but appear to be driven by outliers.
26 
 
5.2 Determinants of maturity structure 
5.2.1 Firm effects 
Table 5 reports the results of the debt maturity structure regressions.
27  These regressions 
are estimated on the full sample and the sub-samples as previously discussed. Column 
one reports the regression for the full sample, column two provides evidence for the sub-
sample of developed economies only and column three the sub-sample of developing 
economies only. Columns four and five provide evidence for the sub-periods, 1991-1998 
and 1999-2006, respectively. Column six provides evidence for sub-sample representing 
OECD countries for which pension fund asset information is available. 
 [Table 5 about here] 
The coefficients of the firm-specific variables are largely consistent with prior 
research (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Guedes and Opler, 1996; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999) in the full sample and all sub-samples and sub-
periods.  Long-term debt is used more by firms with greater asset tangibility, larger size 
and higher profits. However, in contrast to the findings in the U.S., we find that the 
                                                 
26 In particular, the high leverage ratios of South Korean firms generate the relation between leverage and 
inflation volatility, deposits and deposit insurances in both the developed economies subsample and the 
1999-2006 sub-period. South Korea is characterised by high inflation volatility, a relatively small banking 
sector, the existence of deposit insurance and a relatively high level of domestic savings. After dropping 
South Korea, inflation volatility, the size of the banking sector and deposit insurance are all insignificantly 
related to leverage.  
27 The results are robust to the use of alternative proxies for the country’s legal system, corruption, taxation 
and financial market development.  In addition, results are substantially unchanged when we winsorize all 
variables at the 1 percent level.   25
market-to-book ratio is only weakly associated with debt maturity in the full sample and 
is unrelated to debt maturity in the developed economy subsample. 
Appendix 4 reports the results of the country-by-country debt maturity 
regressions.  The most robust cross-sectional determinant of debt maturity is asset 
tangibility.  With one exception, asset tangibility is significantly positively related to debt 
maturity structure.  On the other hand, we find cross-country variation in the signs of the 
estimated coefficients for profitability, firm size and the market-to-book ratio.   
Profitability is positively related to debt maturity structure in 25 (statistically significant 
in 15) out of 39 countries.  Firm size is is positively related to debt maturity structure in 
33 (statistically significant in 21) out of 39 countries and the market-to-book ratio is 
positively related to debt maturity structure in 28 out of 39 countries and is statistically 




5.2.2 Country effects 
The estimates of the country level coefficients reveal that debt maturity is 
negatively related to the level of corruption, but positively related to the common law 
indicator variable, consistent with lower corruption and stronger investor protection 
encouraging the use of long-term debt financing. Also, the existence of an explicit 
bankruptcy code is associated with greater use of long-term debt.  We find that debt 
maturity is positively related to the level of economic development. Overall our results 
                                                 
28 Prior literature also report mixed results. For example, Guedes and Opler (1996) report negative relations 
for U.S. firms, while Stohs and Mauer (1996) find only mixed support for an inverse relationship for U.S. 
firms. Ozkan (2000) reports a positive relationship for U.K. firms. Outside the U.S. and the U.K., 
international evidence generally does not find significant relation between the two variables (Antoniou, 
Guney, and Paudyal, 2006; Terra, 2005).   26
with respect to the relation between maturity structure and country level characteristics 
are more robust than those reported for leverage. 
Consistent with the preferences of the suppliers of capital having an influence on 
the firms’ maturity structures, we find that debt maturity is strongly negatively related to 
the amount of deposits in the country’s banking sector.  This is in contrast to the negative, 
but insignificant banking sector result reported by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999).  Further, we find that the level of domestic savings, measured as gross domestic 
saving over GDP, is negatively related to debt maturity. We also find that debt maturity is 
longer in countries with explicit deposit insurance reflecting the willingness of banks to 
lend longer-term debt when deposits are protected.  In addition, debt maturity is shorter, 
the larger the government bond market. However, we find no reliable relation between 
maturity structure and the degree of insurance penetration. The weak result with respect 
to insurance penetration may be due to the lack of a clear prediction as to the association 
between maturity and insurance penetration.
29 
In general, although the results in all subsamples and sub-periods are similar, 
there are several exceptions. Inflation rate volatility is associated with shorter maturity in 
developed economies, but unrelated to maturity in developing economies. The size of the 
insurance industry is positively related to maturity in developing economies, but 
unrelated to maturity in developed economies. In addition, deposit insurance is associated 
with longer debt maturity only in the latter time period, possibly due to an increase in the 
number of countries adopting explicit deposit insurance from 23 to 33 over the full 
sample period. The size of the government bond market is negatively related to maturity 
                                                 
29 As noted previously, we include a proxy for the size of the insurance sector as a savings vehicle using 
insurance premiums/domestic savings. However, as with insurance penetration, we do not find a significant 
relation between maturity and insurance premiums/domestic savings.   27
only in developed economies and the relation is significant only in the latter time period. 
In addition, for a subsample of OECD countries we find that the level of defined benefit 
pension fund assets is associated with greater use of long-term debt, while the level of 
defined contributions pension fund assets is unrelated to debt maturity. Finally, we find a 
significant positive relation between debt maturity and inflation in the developing 




5.3. Fixed-Effects and Cross-Sectional Estimates 
This section examines the extent to which the cross-sectional and time-series variation in 
our explanatory variables drive our results.  Up to this point our emphasis has been on the 
cross-sectional variation in capital structures.  However, the debt ratios in individual 
countries also vary from year to year, and some of that year to year variation may be 
explained by the year to year changes in our explanatory variables. 
To estimate the extent to which our results are generated from the cross section 
versus the time series we estimate both firm/country fixed-effects and Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) regressions.  Specifically, we report fixed-effects leverage and maturity structure 
regressions in columns one and two of Table 6, respectively. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
leverage and maturity structure regressions with Newey-West corrected standard errors 
are reported in columns three and four, respectively.  By sweeping out individual firm 
and country-effects, the fixed-effects regression estimates the extent to which the time-
series variation of our independent variables explains the time-series of capital structure 
choices.  In contrast, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression estimate the regression model 
                                                 
30 The result that inflation is positively related to debt maturity in both developing economies and the 
earlier time period is generated by the low inflation/short-term maturity characteristic of China. After 
dropping China, inflation is insignificantly related to maturity.   28
for each of the 16 years in sample period and then average the coefficients for all 
independent variables across the 16 years, isolating the cross-sectional determinants of 
capital structure. The coefficients and statistical significance of the independent variables 
are similar to those reported in the cross-sectional, time series regressions (Tables 4 and 
5). 
[Table 6 about here] 
The regression estimates reported in Table 6 indicate that the relationships 
between financing choices and firm characteristics are significant in both the time-series 
and the cross-section, and are consistent with our earlier estimates.  However, the results 
of the inflation and financial institution variables continue to be mixed. The results also 
show that several country variables, in particular corruption and deposit insurance, have 
significant effects on firm capital structure choices even though their time-serial 
variations are small.  
 
5.4 Book values and financing choices 
In this section we examine how the country variables affect the levels of short-term debt, 
long-term debt, and total debt relative to the asset values of the firms in our sample. We 
measure book leverage as the proportion of total debt to total assets of the firm, 
decomposing this measure into short-term debt to total assets and long-term debt to total 
assets.  
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the book leverage regressions. Column one reports   29
the regression for total book leverage, column two provides evidence for the long-term 
debt ratio and column three provides evidence for the short-term debt ratio. As this table 
illustrates, the long-term debt ratio is higher in more developed economies, countries with 
common laws, lower corruption, explicit bankruptcy codes, relatively smaller banking 
sectors, deposit insurance, lower domestic savings, and smaller government bond 
issuances. By contrast, the short-term debt ratio is higher in less developed economies, 
countries not under common laws, countries with higher corruption, higher domestic 
savings, larger banking sectors, lack of deposit insurance, and higher domestic savings. 
Taken together, these results of the long- and short-term debt regressions are consistent 
and complementary with the results of the debt maturity ratio regressions in Table 5.
31   
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
At the outset, we described regression results that indicate that a firm’s capital structure is 
determined more by the country in which it is located than by its industry affiliation, 
suggesting that the institutional environment can have a profound effect on how firms are 
financed.  Specifically, we find that a country’s legal and taxation system, level of 
corruption and the preferences of capital suppliers – banks and pension funds – explain a 
significant portion of the variation in leverage and debt maturity ratios.   
                                                 
31 We also find that inflation rate volatility is associated with lower total debt ratio, which is in contrast to 
the previous results in Table 4, where leverage is measured as total debt to market value. Note also that the 
size of the banking sector is associated with lower total debt ratio. However, this result is driven by the high 
leverage ratios of South Korean firms and relatively small banking sector of the South Korean economy. 
After dropping South Korea the size of the banking sector is insignificantly related to book leverage. 
Interestingly, the results presented in Table 7 indicate that the relationship between financing choices and 
tax is more important when leverage is defined relative to total assets rather than the market value of the 
firm.  
   30
The effects of taxes on capital structure choices are consistent with theory. When 
the tax gain from leverage is positive, firms tilt their capital structures towards more debt.  
However, as we note below, the tax effect is not as strong and pervasive as other 
influences on capital structure.  The legal environment also has an important influence on 
capital structure choices.  Our strongest finding is that firms in countries that are viewed 
as more corrupt tend to be more levered and use more short-term debt.  We also find that 
common law countries have lower leverage and use more long-term debt and that firms in 
countries with an explicit bankruptcy code have higher leverage and use relatively more 
long-term debt. 
We also provide evidence that suppliers of capital can influence how firms are 
financed. Most notably, the debt maturity structure of corporations in countries with 
larger banking sectors tend to be shorter, reflecting the preferences of banks to lend short-
term. However, controlling for the size of the banking sector, firms in countries with 
deposit insurance tend to have longer maturity debt, suggesting that deposit insurance in 
some way facilitates long term lending by banks.  In contrast, our evidence of a relation 
between the size of the insurance sector and capital structure is very weak. However, we 
find that firms in countries with higher levels of defined contributions pension fund assets 
use relatively more equity, while firms in countries with higher levels of defined benefit 
pension fund assets use relatively more long-term debt. In addition, we find evidence that 
a larger government bond sector crowds out private debt capital in the developing 
countries, leading firms in these countries to borrow less. We do not, however, find an 
effect of government borrowing on debt/value ratios of firms in developed countries, but   31
we do find that firms in these countries tend to have shorter maturity debt when the 
government bond market is larger.      
While not all of our results hold across all subgroups and sub-periods, some of the 
results are quite strong and pervasive. This is particularly true in the debt maturity 
regressions where corruption, legal system and the size of the banking sector are very 
strong in all subsamples and sub-periods.  Further, the bankruptcy code and domestic 
savings are also strongly related to debt maturity in all of the subsamples. Deposit 
insurance, while related to debt maturity in most subsamples, is insignificant in the 1991-
1998 sub-period.  
In the leverage regressions the results depend more on subgroups and sub-
periods.   For example, while we find that for the full sample, leverage is higher in 
countries where the tax gain from leverage is positive, we do not find a significant 
relation between the tax gain to leverage and debt ratios in the developing economies 
subsample and the tax effect is insignificant in the 1991-1998 sub-period.  Likewise, the 
effect of both common law and bankruptcy code are insignificant if we restrict the sample 
to developing economies. However, the relationship between financial leverage and 
corruption is strong and significant in all subsamples. 
Although our emphasis has been on the effect of cross-country differences in 
institutions on corporate financial choices, our analysis may have implications for the 
literature on how institutions can promote economic growth.
32  Specifically, the fact that 
institutions influence how firms are financed may provide an indirect channel through 
which a country’s institutions affect economic growth.  For example, there is reason to 
                                                 
32 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) find 
that, for a sample of developing and developed countries, the development of stock markets, bond markets 
and banks facilitate economic growth.   32
believe that if firms can raise more of their capital with equity and long-term debt, they 
will be better able to make longer-term investments, which may better promote economic 
growth.  This suggests that an analysis of the relation between investment horizons and 
institutional structure offers an interesting avenue for future research. 
   33
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Figure 1 
Median leverage ratio of sample firms (1991-2006) 
This figure plots the median leverage ratio across 39 different countries.  The leverage ratio is measured as total debt over the market value of the firm.  Total 
debt is defined to be the book value of current and long-term interest bearing debt.  Market value of the firm is defined to be the market value of common equity 
plus book value of preferred stock plus total debt.   39
Figure 2 
Median long-term debt ratio of sample firms (1991-2006) 
This figure plots the median debt maturity ratio across 39 different countries.  The debt maturity ratio is measured as long-term interest bearing debt over total 
debt.  Total debt is defined to be the book value of current and long-term interest bearing debt.   




The table provides a description of the sample.  The number of years that data is available for each country.  The mean 
number of firms per year for each country.  The median value of the proportion of firms represented in the sample for 
each country, by number of firms and market capitalization. 
       Time series median value 
Country 
Number of 
years of data 
used 
Number of 
firms in the 
sample  Firm-years 
Number of firms in the 
sample/Total number of 
listed firms 
Market capitalization of firms in 
the sample/Stock market 
capitalization 
Australia  16 1554  8308  0.50  0.79 
Austria  16 139  1144  0.75  0.61 
Belgium  16 169  1485  0.59  0.49 
Brazil  16 351  2591  0.46  0.87 
Canada  16 1865  10988  0.34  0.79 
Switzerland  16 274  2656  0.72  0.77 
Chile  16 158  1424  0.41  0.58 
China  13 1530  6827  0.57  0.44 
Germany  16 1011  9209  0.90  0.69 
Denmark  16 208  2123  0.64  0.88 
Spain  16 223  2315  0.17  0.48 
Finland  16 175  1684  0.95  0.83 
France  16 1205  9664  0.87  0.73 
UK  16 2861  21785  0.67  0.62 
Greece  16 321  2511  0.64  0.53 
Hong Kong  16 939  7108  0.62  0.85 
Indonesia  16 295  2573  0.62  0.70 
India  15 637  4388  0.07  0.39 
Ireland  16 109 880  0.89  0.49 
Israel  13 181 949  0.15  0.36 
Italy  16 343  2810  0.73  0.55 
Japan  16 4088  42611  0.97  0.86 
Korea  16 970  6741  0.40  0.72 
Mexico  16 151  1230  0.51  0.92 
Malaysia  16 1011  7586  0.71  0.86 
Netherlands  16 280  2612  0.73  0.88 
Norway  16 266  1826  0.77  0.92 
New Zealand  16 134 954  0.49  0.94 
Pakistan  16 114  1061  0.11  0.42 
Peru  14 74 491  0.20  0.55 
Philippine  16 188  1648  0.53  0.81 
Portugal  16 110 867  0.67  0.61 
Singapore  16 628  4111  0.76  0.82 
Sweden  16 447  3394  0.86  0.91 
Thailand  16 481  3457  0.60  0.73 
Turkey  15 201  1422  0.40  0.74 
Taiwan  16 1399  7051  0.68  0.74 
USA  16 11119  77909  0.81  0.81 
South Africa  16 558  3699  0.53  0.78 
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T a b l e   2         
Summary statistics 
The table provides the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum values of each variable.  Leverage ratio is the ratio of total 
debt to market value of the firm.  Total debt is defined to be the book value of short-term and long-term interest bearing debt.  Market value of 
the firm is defined to be the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock plus total debt.  Maturity structure ratio is the 
ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Tangible assets/total assets is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, operating risk is measured as the 
absolute value of the annual change in ROA, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets and the market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of total debt over total assets.   Country 
characteristic variables are Development economy is a dummy variable equal to one when the country is classified as developed according to 
the World Bank classification based on countries’ gross national income levels.  Inflation rate is the annual rate of change in a country’s CPI.  
Inflation rate volatility is the standard deviation of inflation rates from period t-4 to t.  Corruption index is an index ranging from 0 to 10, with 
larger value indicating more severe corruption.  Common law is a dummy variable equal to one when a country adopts the common law 
system.  Bankruptcy code is a dummy variable equal to one if an insolvent firm is most likely to undergo a reorganization proceeding. Tax is 
an estimate of the miller tax ratio calculated using statutory tax rates. Deposits is the ratio of a country’s bank deposits to GDP. Deposit 
insurance is a dummy variable equal to one if bank deposits are insured by government. Domestic savings is the ratio of gross domestic saving 
to GDP. Insurance penetration is the value of a country’s total insurance premiums to GDP. Pension fund regulation index is an index of 
relative restrictions on debt and equity holdings of pension funds ranging from 1 to 4. Defined benefit pensions is the value of the country’s 
defined benefit pension fund assets to GDP. Defined contribution pensions is the value of the country’s defined contribution pension fund 
assets to GDP. Government bonds is the ratio of the value of domestically denominated government bonds to GDP. 
Variables N  Mean  Std  Dev  Median  Minimum Maximum 
Leverage  ratio  264236  0.29 0.26 0.22  0.00  1.00 
Maturity structure ratio  235874  0.53  0.34  0.57  0.00  1.00 
Tangible assets/total assets  264236  0.33  0.24  0.29  0.00  0.97 
ROA 264236  -0.13  0.98  0.02  -12.25  0.43 
Log total assets  264236  19.76  4.21  19.82  -10.93  31.94 
Market-to-book  ratio  264236  2.50 6.87 1.51  -35.15  63.26 
Developed  economy  624 0.86 0.35 1.00  0.00  1.00 
Inflation  rate  624 0.03 0.05 0.02  -0.04 0.54 
Inflation rate volatility  624  0.02  0.39  0.01  0.00  32.88 
Corruption  index  624 3.01 1.74 2.50  0.00  9.43 
Common  law  624 0.59 0.49 1.00  0.00  1.00 
Bankruptcy  code  624 0.68 0.47 1.00  0.00  1.00 
Tax  624 0.23 0.15 0.28  -0.30 0.51 
Deposits  624 0.93 0.57 0.67  0.13  2.46 
Deposit  insurance  624 0.87 0.34 1.00  0.00  1.00 
Domestic  savings  624 0.23 0.09 0.22  0.09  0.52 
Insurance  penetration  624 0.08 0.03 0.09  0.01  0.18 
Pension fund regulation index  457  3.18  1.06  4.00  1.00  4.00 
Defined benefit pensions  72  37.55  19.07  48.10  .08  71.33 
Defined  contribution  pensions  72  24.72 18.41 29.86 .03  119.97 
Government  bonds  624 0.36 0.25 0.30  0.00  1.19 
 





The table provides correlation matrix for our sample.  Pearson correlation coefficients for all independent variables, leverage and debt maturity, together 
with each pairing of independent variables are presented.  Variables are as defined in Table 2. 
        [1]  [2]  [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]  [10] 
Leverage  ratio  [1]  1.000            
Maturity  structure  ratio  [2]  0.062  1.000          
ROA  [3]  0.033  0.096  1.000         
Log  total  assets  [4]  0.182  -0.030  0.253  1.000        
Market-to-book  ratio  [5]  -0.136  0.012  0.082  -0.042  1.000       
Developed  economy  [6]  -0.075  0.139  -0.058  -0.122  0.025  1.000      
Inflation  rate  [7]  0.021  0.001  0.013 -0.060 -0.001 -0.374 1.000       
Inflation rate volatility  [8]  0.014  -0.011  0.005  -0.028  -0.006  -0.091  0.340  1.000     
Corruption  index  [9]  0.165  -0.210  0.066 0.313 -0.041 -0.757 0.328 0.073 1.000   
Common law  [10]  -0.157  0.173  -0.112  -0.414 0.035 0.054 -0.013 -0.041 -0.293 1.000 
Bankruptcy code  [11]  0.071  0.095  -0.060  0.163 -0.003 0.283 -0.045 -0.039 0.089 -0.072 
Tax  [12]  0.061  0.036  0.014 0.213 0.014 -0.041  -0.118 0.019 0.080 0.014 
Deposits [13]  0.070  -0.135  0.045  0.337 -0.027 0.234 -0.325 -0.044 -0.147 -0.315 
Deposit insurance  [14]  0.037  0.107  -0.027  0.014  0.009  0.298 -0.042 -0.067 -0.130 -0.126 
Domestic savings  [15]  0.109  -0.229  0.114  0.337 -0.039 -0.401 -0.117 -0.003 0.323 -0.349 
Insurance penetration  [16]  0.003  -0.066  0.021 0.183 -0.010 0.317 -0.257 -0.046 -0.206 -0.066 
Pension fund regulation index   [17]  -0.034  0.071  -0.068 0.000 0.029 0.431 -0.160 -0.080 -0.192 0.159 
Defined benefit pensions  [18]  0.148  0.254  -0.108  -0.463  0.065  0.158  0.385  -0.185  -0.473  0.821 
Defined contribution pensions  [19]  -0.088  -0.089  -0.082 -0.343 0.046 0.075 0.272 -0.108 -0.295 0.395 
Government  bonds  [20]  0.061  -0.107  0.072 0.272 -0.025 0.158 -0.195 -0.043 0.015 -0.467 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Correlation matrix 
 
The table provides correlation matrix for our sample.  Pearson correlation coefficients for all independent variables, leverage and debt 
maturity, together with each pairing of independent variables are presented.  Variables are as defined in Table 2. 
        [11]  [12]  [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 
Bankruptcy  code  [11]  1.000           
Tax  [12]  0.344  1.000         
Deposits  [13]  0.088  0.297  1.000        
Deposit  insurance  [14]  0.521  0.117  0.053  1.000       
Domestic  savings  [15]  -0.256  0.113  0.296 -0.406 1.000         
Insurance penetration  [16]  0.061  0.143  0.465  0.102  0.013  1.000       
Pension fund regulation index   [17]  0.549  0.441  0.269  0.337  -0.396  0.033  1.000     
Defined  benefit  pensions  [18]  0.391  0.209  -0.622 0.323 -0.686 -0.176 0.225 1.000   
Defined  contribution  pensions  [19]  0.081  0.060  -0.555 0.141 -0.430 0.128 -0.039 0.730 1.000 
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Table 4   
Leverage, firm and country level determinants 
This table presents regressions of leverage on both firm and country level variables, as defined in Table 2.  All regressions include dummy variables for 
industry (two digit SIC codes).  The sample is divided between developed and developing economies as defined by the developed economy indicator
variable, a sample of OECD member countries for which pension fund bond/equity holding restriction information is available and a select sample of 
OECD countries for which pension fund asset information is available. The sample is split into two sub-samples, 1991-1998 and 1999-2006.  This table 
also reports the adjusted R-squared and number of firm-year observations.  Standard errors are robust to clustering within country over time.  T-statistics 
are given in parentheses. 







Economy  1991-1998  1999-2006  OECD Select OECD  
Independent  variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
            
Firm Factors:            
Tangible  assets/total  assets 0.2178  0.2274 0.1171 0.1738 0.2359  0.2176  0.2221 
  (28.68)***  (25.93)*** (11.39)*** (19.32)*** (25.76)***  (25.65)***  (15.28)*** 
ROA  -0.0201  -0.0144 -0.2268 -0.1737 -0.0117  -0.0159  -0.0074 
  (-3.77)***  (-3.04)*** (-8.44)*** (-3.63)*** (-2.41)***  (-3.12)***  (-1.76)*** 
Log  total  assets  0.0065  0.0057 0.0109 0.0070 0.0060  0.0056  0.0029 
  (7.97)***  (7.09)*** (7.82)*** (4.51)*** (7.11)***  (7.05)***  (5.20)*** 
Market-to-book  ratio  -0.0081  -0.0075 -0.0096 -0.0110 -0.0071  -0.0076  -0.0068 
  (-18.04)***  (-16.98)*** (-10.45)*** (-12.69)*** (-18.62)***  (-16.97)***  (-13.89)*** 
Country factors:            
Developed economy  0.1006      0.1075  0.1071  0.1069  0.1361 
 (6.20)***      (4.42)***  (5.80)***  (4.53)***  (2.28)*** 
Inflation  rate  -0.0363  -0.2222 0.0917 -0.0674 0.0650  -0.0958  -0.6182 
  (-0.66)  (-0.92) (1.75)* (-0.58)  (1.17) (-1.35)  (-1.47) 
Inflation rate volatility  0.0043  1.1850 0.0033 0.0029 0.3570 0.0093  1.2617 
 (0.74)  (2.04)**  (0.57)  (0.41)  (2.29)***  (1.51)  (2.84)*** 
Corruption  index  0.0222  0.0232 0.0261 0.0255 0.0183  0.0240  0.0092 
  (6.89)***  (6.28)*** (5.12)*** (5.69)*** (4.71)***  (6.60)***  (1.98)** 
Common law  -0.0330  -0.0477  0.0430  -0.0537  -0.0266  -0.0410  -0.2615 
 (-3.91)***  (-5.43)***  (0.98)  (-4.46)***  (-2.61)***  (-4.52)***  (-7.23)*** 
Bankruptcy  code  0.0113  0.0097 -0.0136 0.0197 0.0068  0.0123  0.0378 
 (3.51)***  (2.87)***  (-1.51)  (4.16)***  (2.13)**  (2.66)***  (2.32)** 
Tax  0.0654  0.1005 -0.0778 -0.0268 0.1790  0.1176  0.1295 
 (2.22)**  (3.05)***  (-1.01)  (-0.78)  (5.03)***  (3.55)***  (1.70)* 
Deposits/GDP  0.0004  -0.0198 -0.0057 -0.0178 0.0060  -0.0060  -0.0298 
 (0.05)  (-2.25)**  (-0.08)  (-1.13)  (0.72)  (-0.55)  (-1.48) 
Deposit  insurance  0.0069  -0.0066 0.0400 -0.0016 0.0116  0.0082  -0.0067 
 (2.36)***  (-2.15)**  (4.81)***  (-0.29)  (3.31)***  (1.85)***  (-0.59) 
Domestic  savings  0.0044  0.0008 -0.0102 0.0178 0.0007  0.0002  -0.0181 
  (1.25) (0.19)  (-1.34)  (2.85)***  (0.22) (0.04)  (-2.23)*** 
Insurance  penetration  -0.0007  0.0930 0.1373 0.2201 -0.0645  0.0007  1.6296 
  (-0.01)  (0.71) (0.42) (1.14) (-0.49)  (0.01)  (2.13)** 
Government  bonds  -0.0350  -0.0238 -0.1942 -0.1212 -0.0345  -0.0389  -0.2254 
  (-1.60)  (-1.07) (-3.37)***  (-4.19)*** (-1.18)  (-1.72)***  (-5.37)*** 
Pension fund regulation index            -0.0068   
         (-1.78)***   
Defined  benefit  pensions           0.0032 
           (3.35)*** 
Defined  contribution  pensions           -0.0024 
           (-2.20)** 
Number of observations  250668  218847  31821  87515  163153  232656  112722 
Adjusted  R-square  0.1798  0.1959 0.1689 0.1958 0.1932  0.1862  0.1891 
*,**, and ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5      
Debt maturity structure, firm and country level determinants
This table presents regressions of debt maturity on both firm and country level variables, as defined in Table 2.  All regressions include 
dummy variables for industry (two digit SIC codes).  The sample is dividend between developed and developing economies as defined by the 
developed economy indicator variable, a sample of OECD member countries for which pension fund bond/equity holding restriction 
information is available and a select sample of OECD countries for which pension fund asset information is available. This table also reports 
the adjusted R-squared and number of firm-year observations.  Standard errors are robust to clustering within country over time.  T-statistics 
are given in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: Long-term debt/Total debt 








Independent  variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
           
Firm Factors:           
Tangible assets/total assets  0.2648  0.2707  0.2990  0.2704  0.2659  0.2699 
  (46.94)*** (44.70)*** (23.77)*** (37.8)*** (37.34)***  (39.22)*** 
ROA  0.0765 0.0800 0.0650  0.0701  0.0733  0.0811 
 (24.22)***  (26.65)***  (4.30)***  (7.12)***  (22.36)***  (46.43)*** 
Log total assets  0.0139  0.0152  0.0157  0.0106  0.0149  0.0168 
  (23.32)*** (26.44)*** (12.12)***  (16.58)***  (20.74)***  (24.57)*** 
Market-to-book  ratio  0.0005 0.0001 0.0034  0.0004  0.0003  -0.0038 
 (1.61)  (0.44)  (3.67)***  (0.83)  (1.23)  (-1.55) 
Country factors:           
Developed economy  0.1422      0.1434  0.1296  0.0796 
 (8.94)***      (5.23)***  (7.12)***  (2.09)** 
Inflation  rate  0.0883 0.2335 0.1641  0.2414  0.0047  0.9699 
 (1.31)  (0.97)  (3.17)***  (2.09)**  (0.09)  (2.54)*** 
Inflation rate volatility  0.0046  -3.0938 0.0054  0.0002  -0.2641  -1.6375 
 (0.70)  (-5.00)***  (0.90)  (0.04)  (-1.73)*  (-4.65)*** 
Corruption  index  -0.0352 -0.0335 -0.0145  -0.0321  -0.0386  -0.0043 
  (-11.71)*** (-9.57)***  (-4.03)*** (-8.45)*** (-9.81)***  (-1.81)* 
Common  law  0.0749 0.0742 0.1821  0.0977  0.0736  0.1424 
  (8.08)*** (7.54)*** (7.55)***  (6.85)***  (7.23)***  (5.12)*** 
Bankruptcy  code  0.0460 0.0489 0.0096  0.0599  0.0425  0.0258 
  (15.68)*** (14.50)***  (2.19)***  (9.90)*** (14.92)*** (2.84)*** 
Deposits/GDP  -0.1245 -0.1176 -0.2805  -0.0968  -0.1320  -0.1414 
 (-16.33)***  (-13.43)***  (-5.73)***  (-7.81)***  (-15.32)***  (-8.35)*** 
Deposit  insurance  0.0147 0.0147 0.0433  -0.0089  0.0283  0.0110 
  (4.33)*** (3.87)*** (8.98)*** (-1.61) (8.73)***  (1.36) 
Domestic  savings  -0.0335 -0.0419 -0.0201  -0.0332  -0.0353  -0.0116 
 (-11.76)***  (-12.75)***  (-4.25)***  (-6.02)***  (-11.75)***  (-1.69)* 
Insurance  penetration  0.1272 -0.1039 0.6509  0.1880  0.1398  0.6295 
 (1.06)  (-0.79)  (3.40)***  (0.88)  (0.91)  (1.09) 
Government bonds  -0.0814  -0.1301  0.0205  0.0143  -0.0840  -0.0399 
 (-4.74)***  (-8.11)***  (0.64)  (0.53)  (-4.78)***  (-1.19) 
Defined benefit pensions            0.0009 
          (1.73)* 
Defined contribution pensions            -0.0006 
          (-0.91) 
 Number of observations  224527  194976  29551  81539  142988  97635 
Adjusted  R-square  0.2189 0.2041 0.2301  0.2068  0.2222  0.2405 
*,**, and ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6     
Sources of Variation in Leverage and Debt Maturity 
This table presents regressions of both leverage and debt maturity.  The results for leverage are reported in Panel A.  Panel B reports the results 
for debt maturity.  In both panels, Column (1) reports a fixed effects regression for leverage.  Column (3) reports a Fama-MacBeth regression for 
leverage.  Columns (2) and (4) reports the corresponding results for maturity structure. All variables are as defined in Table 2.  Industry dummy 
variables (two digit SIC codes) are included in Columns (3) and (4).  This table also reports the adjusted R-squared and number of firm-year 
observations.  T-statistics are given in parentheses. 
 Fixed  effects  Fama-MacBeth 
Dependent variable:  Total debt/Market 




value of the firm 
Long-term 
debt/Total debt 
Independent variable:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Firm factors:        
Tangible assets/Total assets  0.1610 0.0846  0.1964  0.2692 
  (7.23)*** (5.03)***  (17.83)***  (62.65)*** 
ROA  -0.0260 0.0136  -0.1346  0.0684 
  (-8.29)*** (5.56)***  (-3.06)***  (13.49)*** 
Log total assets  0.0110 0.0044  0.0075  0.0143 
  (4.25)*** (3.74)***  (14.00)***  (21.85)*** 
Market-to-book ratio  -0.0032 0.0006  -0.0085  0.0000 
  (-5.17 )***  (2.92)***  (-14.16)***  (-0.04) 
Country factors:        
Developed economy      0.1140  0.1536 
     (6.44)***  (12.95)*** 
Inflation rate  0.1952  0.0999  -0.0012  -0.1211 
 (2.15)**  (2.12)**  (-0.02)  (-0.74) 
Inflation rate volatility  -0.0050  -0.0046  0.1039  -0.1100 
 (-0.93)  (-2.83)***  (0.62)  (-0.91) 
Corruption index  0.0388  -0.0206  0.0206  -0.0363 
 (2.59)***  (-1.97)**  (7.89)***  (-15.76)*** 
Common law      -0.0336  0.0954 
     (-6.23)***  (20.04)*** 
Bankruptcy code      0.0184  0.0526 
     (4.89)***  (16.63)*** 
Tax 0.1885    -0.0036   
 (1.28)    (-0.15)   
Deposits 0.0293  -0.0123  -0.0243  -0.1089 
 (0.61)  (-0.55)  (-2.15)**  (-9.40)*** 
Deposit insurance  0.0310  -0.0051  -0.0005  0.0074 
 (2.78)***  (-1.01)  (-0.17)  (1.37) 
Domestic savings  -2.7265  0.9638  1.1488  -4.3573 
 (-1.62)  (1.33)  (4.14)***  (-13.62)*** 
Insurance penetration  0.0368  0.0081  0.5433  -0.2434 
 (0.39)  (0.05)  (3.36)***  (-2.65)*** 
Government bonds  -0.0240  -0.0777  -0.0403  0.0002 
 (-1.09)  (-5.42)***  (-1.70)*  (0.01) 
Number of observations  251780  225437  251780  225437 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0757  0.1089  0.1102  0.1923 
*,**, and ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7     
Book Debt Ratios  
This table presents regressions for book leverage, defined as is the ratio of total debt to total assets. We further decompose the book leverage ratio 
into its long-term and short-term components. Column (1) reports the regression for book leverage, defined as is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. Column (2) reports the regression for long-term debt ratio, defined as is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Column (3) reports the 
regression for short-term debt ratio, defined as is the ratio of short-term to total assets. All variables are as defined in Table 2. All regressions 
include dummy variables for industry (two digit SIC codes).  This table also reports the adjusted R-squared and number of firm-year 
observations.  T-statistics are given in parentheses. 
 






Independent variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Firm Factors:      
Tangible assets/Total assets  0.2016  0.1887  0.0110 
 (33.82)***  (46.46)***  (3.35)*** 
ROA -0.1000  -0.0120  -0.0643 
 (-27.77)***  (-6.74)***  (-28.23)*** 
Log total assets  0.0037  0.0063  -0.0019 
 (6.60)***  (23.65)***  (-4.49)*** 
Market-to-book ratio  -0.0024  -0.0008  -0.0010 
 (-5.23)***  (-3.52)***  (-4.68)*** 
      
Country factors:      
Developed economy  0.0667  0.0748  -0.0098 
 (6.61)***  (9.28)***  (-1.78)* 
Inflation rate  -0.0181  -0.0141  -0.0487 
 (-0.46)  (-0.66)  (-1.59) 
Inflation rate volatility  -0.0073  -0.0003  -0.0037 
 (-3.89)***  (-0.15)  (-1.62) 
Corruption index  0.0124  -0.0032  0.0169 
 (5.34)***  (-1.90)***  (15.17)*** 
Common law  -0.0200  0.0214  -0.0353 
 (-5.51)***  (5.34)***  (-12.79)*** 
Bankruptcy code  0.0124  0.0194  -0.0085 
 (6.92)***  (14.51)***  (-7.58)*** 
Tax 0.1121     
 (8.70)***     
Deposits/GDP -0.0163  -0.0402  0.0281 
 (-4.04)***  (-11.55)***  (10.06)*** 
Deposit insurance  0.0004  0.0043  -0.0053 
 (0.27)  (3.31)***  (-4.30)*** 
Domestic savings  0.0054  -0.0069  0.0118 
 (2.65)***  (-4.74)***  (10.96)*** 
Insurance penetration  -0.0545  0.0393  0.0233 
 (-0.84)  (0.77)  (0.63) 
Government Bonds  -0.0337  -0.0306  -0.0011 
 (-3.56)***  (-4.01)***  (-0.19) 
Number of observations  224527  224527  224527 
Adjusted R-square  0.1474  0.1802  0.1676 
*,**, and ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix 1 
Definitions and data sources of country level variables 
Variable Description  Source 
Developed economy  A zero or one dummy variable indicating whether the 
country is classified as developed according to the World 
Bank classification based on countries’ gross national 
income levels 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Inflation rate  Annual rate of change on Consumer Price Index  World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Inflation rate volatility 
Standard deviation of inflation rates from period t-4 to t 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Corruption index  An index ranges from 0 to 10, with larger value indicating 




Common law  An zero or one dummy variable indicating whether a 
country adopts the common law system 
Treisman [2000] 
Bankruptcy code  A proxy for the existence of an explicit bankruptcy code, 
measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 if an insolvent 
firm is most likely to undergo a reorganization proceeding.
Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, 
Shleifer (2008) 
Tax  Estimate of the miller tax ratio equal to (1 - [(after all tax 
value of $dividends)/( after all tax value of $interest)]) 
calculated using statutory tax rates 




A proxy for the degree of financial intermediation of a 









Domestic savings  A proxy for the level of domestic savings measure as the 




Insurance penetration  Value of total insurance premiums/GDP.  Total insurance 







regulation index  
An index of relative restrictions on debt and equity 
holdings of pension funds measured as the ratio of the 
proportional limit on equity holdings over the proportional 
limit on debt holdings, with larger values indicating tighter 
restriction on bond holdings.  The index ranges from 1 to 
4. 
OECD, Survey of 
Investment Regulation of 
Pension Funds 






pensions  Value of defined benefit pension fund assets/GDP. 
OECD 
Defined contribution 
pensions  Value of defined contribution pension fund assets/GDP 
OECD 
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Appendix 2 
Median values of country level dependent variables 






























Australia 1.00  0.03  0.01  1.40 1.00  0.00 0.00  0.60  0.00  0.23  0.04  2.00  0.09  . . 
Austria 1.00  0.02  0.01  2.35 0.00  0.00 0.01  0.82  1.00  0.25  0.02  1.00  0.47  . . 
Belgium 1.00  0.02  0.01  2.90 0.00  1.00 -0.02  0.78  1.00  0.24  0.04  2.00  0.81  . . 
Brazil 0.00  0.08  0.10  6.35 0.00  0.00 0.15  0.37  1.00  0.18  0.00  1.00  0.32  12.36 5.88 
Canada 1.00  0.02  0.01  1.03 1.00  1.00 0.19  0.75  1.00  0.23  0.03  2.00  0.28  52.52 1.49 
Switzerland 1.00  0.01  0.01  1.10 0.00  1.00 0.30  1.25  1.00  0.28  0.07  2.00  0.11  . 102.87 
Chile 0.00  0.05  0.02  2.85 0.00  0.00 0.17  0.43  1.00  0.26  0.02  1.00  0.28  . 59.08 
China 0.00  0.02  0.07  6.60 0.00  0.00 0.30  0.33  0.00  0.42  0.01  2.00  0.15  . . 
Germany 1.00  0.02  0.01  1.94 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.70  1.00  0.22  0.03  2.00  0.28  . . 
Denmark 1.00  0.02  0.00  0.50 0.00  0.00 0.05  0.53  1.00  0.25  0.04  2.00  0.57  2.71 26.92 
Spain 1.00  0.03  0.01  3.35 0.00  1.00 0.18  0.65  1.00  0.23  0.02  3.00  0.32  0.10 6.32 
Finland 1.00  0.01  0.01  0.40 0.00  1.00 0.00  0.48  1.00  0.26  0.07  3.00  0.37  57.85 . 
France 1.00  0.02  0.00  3.00 0.00  1.00 0.17  0.63  1.00  0.20  0.06  3.00  0.39 1.16 . 
United Kingdom  1.00  0.03  0.01  1.52 1.00  0.00 0.13  0.90  1.00  0.16  0.09  3.00  0.33  . . 
Greece 1.00  0.04  0.02  5.25 0.00  0.00 -0.18  0.55  1.00  0.10  0.01  3.00  0.74  . . 
Hong Kong,  1.00  0.02  0.02  2.25 1.00  0.00 0.16  1.92  0.00  0.31  0.03  .  0.09  5.71 15.07 
Indonesia 0.00  0.09  0.03  8.10 0.00  1.00 0.30  0.39  1.00  0.31  0.01  .  0.21  . . 
India 0.00  0.06  0.03  7.20 1.00  0.00 0.35  0.38  1.00  0.23  0.01  .  0.20  . . 
Ireland 1.00  0.03  0.01  2.50 1.00  1.00 0.13  0.70  1.00  0.36  0.07  3.00  0.36  . . 
Israel 1.00  0.04  0.02  2.95 1.00  0.00 0.36  0.74  0.00  0.17  0.03  3.00  0.00  24.11 4.13 
Italy 1.00  0.03  0.01  5.25 0.00  1.00 0.00  0.53  1.00  0.22  0.03  4.00  0.80  0.46 2.04 
Japan 1.00  0.00  0.01  2.90 0.00  1.00 0.35  1.94  1.00  0.27  0.09  4.00  0.60  10.79 0.56 
Korea, Rep.  1.00  0.04  0.02  5.76 0.00  1.00 0.28  0.49  1.00  0.35  0.09  1.00  0.11  0.50 . 
Mexico 0.00  0.10  0.08  6.70 0.00  1.00 0.04  0.23  1.00  0.22  0.01  1.00  0.15  3.09 6.04 
Malaysia 0.00  0.03  0.01  4.90 1.00  0.00 0.28  1.12  1.00  0.43  0.02  1.00  0.34  . . 
Netherlands 1.00  0.02  0.01  1.05 0.00  0.00 0.35  0.99  1.00  0.27  0.05  4.00  0.42 . . 
Norway 1.00  0.02  0.01  1.25 0.00  1.00 0.00  0.50  1.00  0.31  0.02  4.00  0.12  6.51 . 
New Zealand  1.00  0.02  0.01  0.60 1.00  0.00 0.00  0.82  0.00  0.23  0.02  4.00  0.27  3.28 8.53 
Pakistan 0.00  0.08  0.02  7.80 1.00  0.00 0.45  0.30  0.00  0.16  0.00  .  0.36  . . 
Peru 0.00  0.04  0.04  5.90 0.00  1.00 0.30  0.21  1.00  0.18  0.00  .  0.02  . 10.45 
Philippines 0.00  0.07  0.02  7.40 0.00  1.00 0.33  0.47  1.00  0.15  0.01  .  0.35  . . 
Portugal 1.00  0.03  0.01  3.65 0.00  1.00 0.18  0.88  1.00  0.17  0.02  2.00  0.40  11.07 0.48 
Singapore 1.00  0.02  0.01  0.82 1.00  0.00 0.26  0.98  0.00  0.47  0.03  .  0.40  . . 
Sweden 1.00  0.02  0.01  0.80 0.00  0.00 -0.03  0.40  1.00  0.24  0.04  1.00  0.39  . . 
Thailand 0.00  0.04  0.01  6.80 1.00  1.00 0.00  0.94  1.00  0.34  0.01  .  0.02  . 4.72 
Turkey 0.00  0.54  0.05  6.40 0.00  1.00 -0.17  0.32  1.00  0.17  0.00  4.00  0.21  0.38 0.19 
Taiwan 1.00  0.01  0.01  4.45 0.00  1.00 0.03  0.24  1.00  0.14  0.04  .  0.13  . . 
United States  1.00  0.03  0.01  2.40 1.00  1.00 0.35  0.65  1.00  0.16  0.04  4.00  0.29  48.11 32.24 
South Africa  0.00  0.07  0.02  5.30 1.00  0.00 0.30  0.50  0.00  0.19  0.11  2.00  0.46 . .   50
Appendix 3 
Pooled firm-level regressions of leverage by country 
The table presents the regression of leverage on firm level variables as defined in Table 2.  The regression equation is estimated for 
each country using the pooled time-series and cross-sectional sample.  All regressions include dummy variables for industry (two digit 
SIC codes).  This table also reports the adjusted R-squared and number of firm-year observations.  Standard errors are robust to 
clustering within firm over time.  T-statistics are given in parentheses. 
Country Code 
Tangible assets/ 
Total Assets  ROA  Log total assets 
Market-to-book 
ratio 
No of observations/ 
Adjusted R-squared 
Australia  0.0343 -0.0061 0.0264 -0.0072  8221 
  (2.11)** (-1.02) (9.49)***  (-9.11)***  0.1224 
Austria  0.2481 -0.0735 0.0133 -0.0128  1093 
  (2.86)***  (-1.74) *  (2.78) ***  (-3.59)***  0.1129 
Belgium  0.1931 -0.5328  0.016 -0.0132  1406 
  (3.61) ***  (-4.34)***  (5.31)***  (-3.73)***  0.1824 
Brazil  0.1930 -0.1741 -0.0010  -0.0103  2579 
  (3.09)*** (-2.81)***  (-0.31)  (-3.33)***  0.0814 
Canada  0.0924 0.0070 0.0165  -0.0102  10806 
  (5.13)*** (0.78) (4.05)***  (-13.46)***  0.1003 
Switzerland  0.3178 -0.1171 0.0036 -0.0186  2583 
  (7.63) ***  (-2.14) **  (0.83)  (-5.97) ***  0.1926 
Chile  0.0817 -0.1870 0.0181 -0.0091  1413 
  (1.56) (-1.01) (1.87)*  (-2.91)***  0.0840 
China  0.0490 -0.1378 0.0423 -0.0073  6815 
  (2.10)** (-5.87)*** (5.26)***  (-6.85)***  0.1221 
Germany  0.3018 -0.0520 0.0056 -0.0111  8497 
 (9.41)  ***  (-3.02)  (3.73)  (-9.43)  0.1106 
Denmark  0.2503 -0.0762 0.0003 -0.0193  2006 
  (4.27)*** (-1.74)*  (0.08) (-6.15)***  0.1368 
Spain  0.0767 -0.8292 0.0019 -0.0127  2025 
  (1.76)*  (-6.83) ***  (0.85)  (-3.57) ***  0.1600 
Finland  0.4595 -0.2516 0.0055 -0.0149  1591 
  (7.57)*** (-2.68)***  (1.78)  *  (-4.19)***  0.2493 
France  0.3408 -0.1791 0.0081 -0.0134  9063 
  (10.19)*** (-3.48)***  (4.35)*** (-13.25)***  0.1624 
United Kingdom  0.2412 -0.0126 -0.0035  -0.0070  20741 
  (18.10) ***  (-1.93) *  (-2.81) ***  (-16.15) ***  0.1289 
Greece  0.0335 -1.2120 0.0239 -0.0076  2471 
  (0.72) (-8.47)***  (3.30)***  (-7.50)***  0.2250 
Hong Kong  0.2220 -0.0512 0.0035 -0.0130  6493 
  (7.69)*** (-4.03)***  (1.84)* (-10.85)***  0.0982 
Indonesia  0.2525 -0.5076 0.0034 -0.0145  2452 
  (4.55)*** (-5.01)***  (0.70)  (-5.10)***  0.1586 
India  0.4351 -1.3180 -0.0052  -0.0192  4381 
  (11.03)***  (-13.25)*** (-1.16) (-8.95)***  0.4328 
Ireland  0.2047 0.0234 0.0065  -0.0091  854 
  (3.49) ***  (1.67) *  (1.09)  (-3.74)***  0.1095 
Israel  0.5941 -0.0212 0.0221 -0.0081  934 
  (7.69)*** (-0.54)  (1.76)* (-3.06)**  0.3667 
Italy  0.1041 -0.5515 0.0117 -0.0213  2644 
  (1.80) *  (-2.89)***  (2.81)***  (-6.68)***  0.1169 
Japan  0.3655 -0.6499 0.0096 -0.0055  41763 
 (18.55)***  (-6.60)***  (4.70)***  (-6.05)***  0.1116 
Korea  0.1765 -0.1977 0.0595 -0.0201  6734 
  (4.46)*** (-4.92)*** (7.65)*** (-6.03)***  0.1764 
Mexico  0.0821 -0.8375 0.0143 -0.0392  1224 
  (1.03) (-4.14)*** (1.31) (-3.27)***  0.2132 
Malaysia  0.1179 -0.3592 0.0079 -0.0123  7072 
  (3.77)*** (-6.27)*** (3.76)*** (-7.05)***  0.1093 
Netherlands  0.2754 -0.0994 0.0049 -0.0108  2482 
  (6.05)*** (-4.19)***  (1.55)  (-6.52)***  0.1594 
Norway  0.5780 -0.0231 0.0049 -0.0145  1757 
  (19.03)*** (-0.90)  (1.61) (-5.47)***  0.4568 
New Zealand  0.1006 0.0022 0.0033  -0.0150  917 
 (1.68)  *  (0.11)  (0.38)  (-2.29)**     51
Pakistan  0.3415 -1.5769 -0.0064  -0.0197  1045 
  (5.13)*** (-9.76)***  (-0.67)  (-3.67)***  0.4428 
Peru  0.0169 -1.3765 0.0157 -0.0167  491 
  (0.15) (-8.23)*** (1.17)  (-1.50)  0.2523 
Philippines  0.1738 -0.1420 0.0217 -0.0201  1523 
  (2.46) **  (-2.92)***  (5.16)***  (-4.46)***  0.1484 
Portugal  -0.2483 -0.7286  0.0113 -0.0301  840 
  (-3.15)***  (-2.66) ***  (1.67) *  (-4.99)***  0.1775 
Singapore  0.2632 -0.0783 0.0080 -0.0186  3973 
  (8.63)*** (-2.32)**  (2.39)** (-6.50)***  0.1290 
Sweden  0.4990 0.0115 -0.0016  -0.0161  3189 
  (13.16)*** (0.79)  (-0.43)  (-8.47)***  0.3777 
Thailand  0.0853 -0.5986 0.0290 -0.0128  3403 
  (2.09)** (-3.77)*** (3.80)***  (-3.28)***  0.1505 
Turkey  -0.0963 -0.5521  0.0114 -0.0063  1422 
  (-1.54) (-5.16)***  (1.98)**  (-3.02)**  0.1925 
Taiwan  0.0505 -0.8067 0.0395 -0.0411  7051 
  (1.90)*  (-10.40)*** (10.21)*** (-9.31)***  0.3186 
United States  0.2774 0.0052 0.0020  -0.0072  77132 
  (33.04)*** (2.66)  ***  (3.19)*** (-38.41)***  0.1076 
South Africa  0.0780 -0.0442 -0.0110  -0.0073  3483 
   (2.39)**  (-1.65)*  (-4.35) ***  (-4.18) ***  0.0622 
*,**, and ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix 4 
Pooled firm-level regressions of debt maturity structure by country 
The table presents the regression of debt maturity on firm level variables as defined in Table 2.  The regression equation is estimated 
for each country using the pooled time-series and cross-sectional sample.  All regressions include dummy variables for industry (two 
digit SIC codes).  This table also reports the adjusted R-squared and number of firm-year observations.  Standard errors are robust to 
clustering within firm over time.  T-statistics are given in parentheses. 
Country Code  Tangible assets/ 
Total Assets  ROA  Log total assets  Market-to-book 
ratio 
No of observations/ 
Adjusted R-squared 
Australia  0.1720 0.0487 0.0344  -0.0011  6292 
  (6.15)*** (3.15)*** (6.54)***  (-0.72)  0.0991 
Austria  0.3808 -0.1207 -0.0006  0.0005  1025 
  (3.72) ***  (-1.65)  (-0.09)  (0.10)  0.0674 
Belgium  0.4061 0.0641 0.0167  0.0028  1370 
  (5.63)*** (0.50) (3.84)***  (1.14)  0.1333 
Brazil  0.3386 0.1300 0.0217  0.0045  2551 
  (6.98)*** (4.17)*** (5.58)***  (1.99)  **  0.1304 
Canada  0.2135 0.0469 0.0282  -0.0018  8672 
  (8.97)*** (3.05)*** (5.70)***  (-1.49)  0.1144 
Switzerland  0.3620 0.0296 -0.0016  -0.0055  2500 
  (7.95) ***  (0.43)  (-0.33)  (-1.58)  0.1005 
Chile  0.3038 -0.1973 0.0440  0.0086  1301 
  (3.32)*** (-1.23)  (1.87)*  (1.47)  0.1269 
China  0.3953 0.0590 0.0422  0.0006  6499 
  (8.65)*** (2.43)**  (2.35)**  (0.37)  0.1570 
Germany  0.4253 0.0480 -0.0019  0.0021  7523 
 (12.06)  ***  (1.76)*  (-1.06)  (1.52)  0.0846 
Denmark  0.4435 -0.0095 -0.0046  0.0031  1931 
  (7.00)*** (-0.30)**  (-1.07)  (0.85)  0.1098 
Spain  0.3516 -0.1312 -0.0036  0.0059  1967 
  (6.46)*** (-1..00)  (-1.25)  (1.36)  0.0726 
Finland  0.2129 -0.1358 0.0024  -0.0040  1551 
  (4.04) (-2.27)** (0.61)  (-1.22)  0.0512 
France  0.3438 -0.0037 0.0062  0.0008  8972 
  (11.21)*** (-0.11)  (2.93)***  (0.65)  0.0612 
United Kingdom  0.3790 0.0243 0.0077  0.0003  18605 
  (20.40) ***  (2.14) **  (4.55) ***  (0.41)  0.0897 
Greece  0.4844 0.4544 0.0157  -0.0012  2262 
  (7.06)*** (3.14)  ***  (1.20)  (-0.71)  0.1062 
Hong Kong  0.3965 0.0127 0.0012  0.0019  5862 
  (10.76)*** (0.75)  (0.45)  (1.22)  0.0786 
Indonesia  0.3888 0.2320 0.0088  0.0028  2280 
  (6.15)*** (4.72)***  (1.51)  (1.00)  0.0841 
India  0.4336 0.0711 0.0208  0.0012  4286 
  (10.01)*** (0.87)  (3.00)***  (0.57)  0.1092 
Ireland  0.3475 0.0875 0.0210  0.0033  766 
  (4.67)***  (2.26) **  (2.67) ***  (0.95)  0.1232 
Israel  0.3784 -0.0453 0.0283  -0.0008  750 
  (5.21)** (-0.65) (2.42)**  (-0.21)  0.1572 
Italy  0.2976 0.2107 0.0088  -0.0002  2589 
  (5.44) ***  (2.78)***  (1.87)*  (-0.08)  0.0650 
Japan  0.4001 0.1380 0.0118  0.0038  38813 
 (22.97)***  (3.91)***  (6.72)***  (4.97)***  0.0754 
Korea  0.1406 -0.0917 0.0223  0.0049  6303 
  (4.07)*** (-3.18)** (3.62)***  (2.14)**  0.0353 
Mexico  0.3308 0.3566 0.0531  0.0033  1159 
  (3.98)*** (3.97)***  (3.09)**  (0.38)  0.1765 
Malaysia  0.2271 0.1534 0.0017  0.0010  6471 
  (6.02)*** (6.13)***  (0.60)  (0.50)  0.0362 
Netherlands  0.4106 -0.1163 0.0181  0.0058  2270 
  (7.21)*** (-3.13) (3.99)***  (2.37)  **  0.1063 
Norway  0.3817 0.1571 0.0082  -0.0025  1626 
  (9.03)*** (4.89)*** (2.71)  ***  (-0.79)  0.1974 
New Zealand  0.3828 0.0444 0.0022  0.0021  829 
 (5.11)***  (1.57)  (0.43)  (0.33)  0.1088   53
Pakistan  0.6196 -0.2254 0.0107  0.0055  1007 
  (7.57)*** (-1.54)  (0.93)  (1.57)  0.2628 
Peru  0.3047 -0.5953 0.0709  0.0170  467 
  (3.86)*** (-3.26)*** (4.71)***  (2.69)***  0.2179 
Philippines  0.1777 0.0992 0.0188  0.0048  1257 
  (1.96)* (1.61)  (2.94)***  (0.89)  0.0577 
Portugal  0.2685 0.1624 0.0195  -0.0041  824 
  (2.66) ***  (1.10)  (2.03)**  (-0.54)  0.0658 
Singapore  0.4891 0.0633 0.0093  0.0003  3712 
  (12.33)*** (2.61)***  (1.58)  (0.11)  0.1357 
Sweden  0.1782 0.0159 -0.0071  -0.0018  2777 
  (3.92) ***  (0.64)  (-2.46)**  (-0.60)  0.0347 
Thailand  0.3126 -0.0663 0.0413  0.0119  3271 
  (6.73)*** (-1.49) (3.61)*** (4.63)***  0.1136 
Turkey  0.2459 -0.0509 0.0206  0.0088  1286 
  (3.12)*** (-0.73) (2.83)*** (2.79)  ***  0.0505 
Taiwan  0.3771 0.1934 0.0452  0.0191  6564 
  (11.08)*** (3.19)***  (9.26)***  (4.19)***  0.1224 
United States  0.3169 0.0878 0.0176  -0.0010  66323 
  (35.85)*** (32.97)*** (24.42)***  (-3.38)***  0.1801 
South Africa  0.3702 -0.0239 -0.0070  0.0063  3065 
  (9.45)***  (-0.75)  (-2.97) ***  (3.36) ***  0.1025 
*,**, and ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 